The Sino-Soviet Split
A Reappraisal
The political class and much of the intelligence establishment exaggerated the depth of the “split” between the Soviet Union and China. Such a strategic error brought about near disastrous consequences to America:
1) Chronic trade deficits.
2) Economic dependence on communist China.
3) Exports of technology to Beijing’s war machine.
4) Ignoring the continued development of the Sino-Russian alliance directed against the United States and its true meaning for American national security.
American national security and sovereignty has been compromised by our naiveté and arguably willful blindness towards the threat posed by the Sino-Russian Axis. This situation evolved as a result of the tremendous miscalculation of elements of our CIA, the Nixon Administration, and liberal internationalists such as Henry Kissinger. They believed that they could split the communist camp up, thus weakening the global threat of Moscow and Beijing. Even staunch anti-communists such as Ronald Reagan also adhered to this point of view, despite campaign promises to reevaluate our relations with Beijing. In fact, during the 1980 election, candidate Reagan proclaimed “They (USSR and China) were allies and the only argument that caused their split was an argument over how to best destroy us.”[1] Candidate Reagan was also asked if his Administration would sell weapons to communist China. His answer was “No, because…they could turn right around and the day after tomorrow discover that they and the Soviets have more in common than they have with us.”[2] The Reagan Administration opened the floodgates for high technology and weapons exports to Red China during much of the 1980s. Throughout the Cold War, a motley crew of voices questioned the veracity of the split. They either believed that it was a strategic deception launched by the USSR and China or (like me) vastly exaggerated. Let’s examine these statements. In an interview with John Birch Society (JBS) Public Relations Director John F. McManus (1984), Avraham Shifrin (a former adviser to the contracts department in the Soviet Ministry of Defense) stated that the American “opening” to China was a “big mistake.” He stated further, “because these two gangs of killers-China and Soviet Union-they can unite in one night and then they will go against you with your equipment and your weapons which you now sent also to China.” His wife Eleonora chimed in, “The Soviet Union and China have split only in word to cheat you and to get your help separately one by one, pretending they are enemies while in fact they are not.”[3] On the other end of the political spectrum, AFL-CIO leader George Meany commented after President Nixon’s “opening” to the PRC (the People’s Republic of China): “Red China is still a slave state where human freedom is non-existent. It still has its program in company with the Soviets for Communist world domination, and the only difference between them and the Soviet Union on this question is: How do you accomplish your objective?”[4] In 1981, Miles Costick and Marc Dean Millot of the Institute on Strategic Trade (IST) noted that Red China still favored the “extension of communism throughout the world…This whole question of the ‘China card’ and using China against the Soviets and so on is, in my view, extremely simple-minded --simplistic.”[5] Unfortunately, these concerns never gained full traction because it was more comforting and profitable to believe that the Sino-Soviet alliance was irreparably fractured.
A skeptical reader of this paper will ask: What is the evidence that the split between the Soviet Union and China was either a fake or exaggerated? The documented evidence proving my point is compelling. It should give pause for those voices who recommend engaging with Russia as a tool to break up its alliance with Communist China. Even if we accept the validity of the split with China, Beijing remained hostile to the long-term interests of the United States. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership sought to deceive the US by toning down its anti-American rhetoric and limiting its support for revolution abroad. Why? To gain vital technologies to modernize the military and industrial sector, with the long-term goal for defeating the United States. In 1978, Chinese Communist dictator Deng Xiaoping admitted in a secret speech, “…We belong to the Marxist Camp and can never be so thoughtless that we cannot distinguish friends from enemies. Nixon, Ford, Carter, and future American imperialistic leaders all fall into this category (enemies).” Clearly, the “reformist” Deng and the CCP continued to view the US as an enemy, not a partner, friend, or even a competitor. Deng’s sentiments were unequivocal. Deng continued, “They want to use the split between us and the USSR to destroy the world socialist system in order to manipulate and lessen the Soviet threat toward themselves. Why can’t we take advantage of the contradiction and grudge that exists between them and initiate actions that would be favorable to our national policy? …What we need mainly is scientific and technical knowledge and equipment. This would contribute the most to our modernization plans. At the same time, improvement in China-USA relations is inevitable and as and as this relationship develops the American imperialists will defer to our wishes.”[6] Deng clearly sensed that his split with the USSR was something that could benefit China in its quest to ultimately overtake the United States. Beijing realized that the Americans were wrapped up in the idea that they could sic China against the USSR, even though the CCP still sought the downfall of the US. Deng admitted in the same speech that “in the future” the “American imperialists” will “have no way of avoiding defeat by our hands.”[7] Other Chinese Communist officials echoed Deng’s sentiments in earlier speeches. Keng Piao, member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chief of the Foreign Liaison Department, remarked in a speech given in 1976, “We now seldom use the USA imperialist terminology and only on occasion accuse them of being one of the two mighty rulers. Does this mean we have abandoned the basic principles of Marxism Leninism or that we are no longer opposed to imperialism and colonialism?...The Soviet revisionists and the American imperialists will forever remain the source from which war will originate.” This is an admission that China opposed not only the USSR (while allying and dealing with them in a low-profile manner) but the US. The CCP just muted its extreme anti-Americanism as a measure of strategic deception, not a shift in convictions. Keng complained that hardline elements within the CCP saw the “US ruling class” as a monolithic bloc. He stated that these forces “fail to see the soft and weak side which can be exploited. They fail to see the possibility to struggle against these weaknesses and take advantage of them.” Keng reiterated that “the USA is still and imperialist nation…We will wait until the day that we think the opportunity is ripe and then issue a sincere notice for Uncle Sam to pack up and get out.”[8] Again, another exhibit of strategic deception, courtesy of the CCP. On July 30, 1977 Foreign Minister Huang Hua noted in a speech that China would “enter a period of major construction and there are many advanced scientific techniques and scientific management experiences we need to learn from the USA. We must purchase various types of precision and scientific equipment from the USA. We must, through other exchange methods, obtain more data on industries, construction and scientific and research techniques…”[9] Huang (presumably speaking on behalf of the rest of the CCP leadership) believed that the “opening” of relations with the US would allow its agents (inside splinter communist parties, leftover New Leftists, and agents within labor unions) to foment communist revolution inside the US. As Huang noted in the same speech, “The USA has a large labor production force, and a strong dormant revolutionary strength. Through association, we can plant the seeds of Marxism Leninism and Maoism in the United States and let them sprout roots and grow big.”[10] Two years after Nixon’s visit to Beijing, a confidential directive of the Central Committee of the CCP (March 30, 1973) asserted “…Now our influences have reached the United States. If only we work with patience and enthusiasm, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung’s thought will definitely be integrated with the practices of the revolutionary movement in the United States, thereby speeding up the process of revolution in the United States...”[11] At the end of the day, the CCP did not renounce war as a positive good in global politics. Deng stated, “Although the Third World War may kill more people with nuclear weapons than the Second World War, it would also solve the present problems of the world more easily.”[12] Despite the seeming détente of the 1980s, the latent anti-Americanism of the CCP lay just beneath the surface. On June 7, 1989, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops opened fire on the American Embassy and diplomatic apartments at the Jianguomenwai compound while Ambassador James Lilley discussed evacuation plans. Lilley feared that the Chinese would storm the US Embassy and seize the dissident Fang Lizhi, who sought shelter there.[13] All facts that should give Americans pause about the intentions of China throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Even Americans who believed the split was real and irreconcilable could conceivable argue that Beijing’s long range intentions were at odds with the US.
Now, one could ask the following question: Why is this still relevant today? After all, the Cold War is over, isn’t it? Contrary to the popular belief that the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, Russia and China officially repaired their relations as a result of the Gorbachev-Deng summit in May 1989. Open military and industrial cooperation became an important feature of the post-1989 Russian-Chinese relationship. Economic relations tightened between the two countries. However, what was the response of the Americans? More trade and engagement. Fast forward to the 2020s and we continued to ignore the growing Sino-Russian threat. Most distressing was the Trump Administration’s strategy of looking for “splits” within the camp of our adversaries. Sources indicated that the Trump Administration hoped to drive a “wedge” between Russia and China. A source familiar with planning such a policy indicated that such meetings between the US (led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo) and Russia could be “exploring opportunities to work with Russia and China on arms control…but at the same time, working with Russia where our interests coincide, and China’s do not…That would have a positive result of driving a wedge between Russia and China…That is something that would be of value to the U.S. Russia is nervous about China.”[14] Along with many good suggestions, a report titled “Russian Strategic Intentions” mistakenly recommended that “the US should bilaterally engage Russia to peel them away from China’s orbit.”[15] Some national security experts stubbornly clung to the Kissingerian tactic of splitting the anti-American bloc up. In this case, these advocates of a sort of Realpolitik sought to split the Sino-Russian alliance up. One analyst in this camp is the heavily credentialed David Pyne, who is the Executive Vice President of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security. While no fan whatsoever of the Putin/CCP domestic policies, Pyne was an apologist for Russia’s actions in Ukraine and claimed that provocative actions by the US led to our deteriorating relations with Russia. (This was certainly not the case, as I have documented in other Substack papers and books that I have written). Another advocate of this form of Realpolitik was the late Dr. Peter Vincent Pry (who is excellent on virtually all national defense issues). In a podcast interview with Patrick Bet-David, Dr. Pry recommended “Our job number one is to split the Russian-China alliance. That’s our best hope for prevailing in a New Cold War. That is our highest priority. To split that alliance. And I think it is possible to do it because I think Putin and Russia has been discontented with that alliance…”[16] What evidence led Dr. Pry to conclude that Putin and Russia were “discontented” by their alliance with China? The evidence seemed to point to the contrary, since both Moscow and Beijing shared the same goal: the downfall of the US. Most revealing were the responses by China and Russia to these proposals. Moscow and Beijing dismissed these plans to split their alliance. Similarly, the Soviets and Chinese waved away any talk of a breakup of their alliance (despite ideological polemics to the contrary). History repeats itself. In an article titled “China Cannot Be Fooled,” Beijing threw water on Pyne’s belief[17] that the US could cede spheres of influence to China and Russia in exchange for peace. Pyne, rightly concerned about the Sino-Russian bloc’s ability to defeat the US, advocated the effective surrender of Ukraine to Russia and Taiwan to China. While this article admitted that Pyne’s plan was “very beneficial to China,” it also (rightfully) saw through his intentions (restoring America’s domestic manufacturing and military power) as detrimental to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In fact, the Chinese believed that Pyne’s plan would be a “disguised weakening of China's overall competitiveness.”[18] An article authored by the Russian Institute of International Political and Economic Strategies (Russtrat) also took Pyne’s plans to task, claiming that its intention was the “destruction of the strengthening alliance of Russia and China.” The Russian article cited ominously claimed that this alliance would, “inevitably wipe America off the face of the earth in the event of a major war.” The Russian article claimed that Pyne’s plan was “doomed to failure” since its ultimate purpose was for American to regain its “lost military power on the planet at all costs.” The Russians even took offense when Pyne claimed that the US could send troops to Eastern Europe in the event of a wholesale Russian invasion. If anything, according to the Russians, Pyne’s plans pushed the Russians and Chinese “to strengthen their strategic partnership, and secondly, to increasingly frequent conversations with Washington from a position of strength.” Furthermore, Russians declared that “it is definitely not worth negotiating with America at the cost of destroying the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership.” Lastly, the Russians laugh at Pyne, declaring their hope for the “collapse of this global American ‘vacuum cleaner,’ with the deconstruction of the planetary and national institutions serving it, will make it possible to build a more just world order on Earth.”[19] Pyne’s plans and the reactions of Beijing and Moscow remind me of the apocryphal remark of Khrushchev, “We spit in their face, and they call it dew.”[20]
It is significant that after the split with the Soviet Union in 1960, both countries issued statements which highlighted their commonalities despite their ideological differences. This is significant, since the split was viewed as temporary, especially in case of war with the United States (termed “imperialism” or the “imperialists.”). Both Beijing and Moscow issued these public statements. These pronouncements continued as late as the mid-1960s, five years after the split. A 1966 letter from the Central Committee of the CCP to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) confirmed, “…the great peoples of China and the Soviet Union will eventually sweep away all obstacles and unite on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The Soviet people may rest assured that once the Soviet Union meets with imperialist aggression and puts up resolute resistance, China will definitely stand side by side with the Soviet Union and fight against the common enemy.”[21] In a February 1963 meeting with the Chinese Ambassador Pan Tzu Li, Khrushchev promised that “when we throw the last shovel on the grave of capitalism, we will throw it with China.”[22] Premier Zhou Enlai pointed out in 1964 that “Whatever happens, the fraternal Chinese and Soviet peoples will stand together in any storm that breaks out in the world arena.”[23] The Central Committee of the CCP noted to Khrushchev in April 1964 that “…Although at present there are differences between you and us on a number of questions of principle concerning Marxism-Leninism and there is a lack of unity, we are deeply convinced that all this is only temporary. In the event of a major world crisis, the two parties, our two countries and our two peoples, will undoubtedly stand together against our common enemy.”[24] Claims that the above quotes were meaningless statements or eyewash are put to rest by the transcripts of private meetings between CCP and CPSU officials and their allies. Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin noted to Chinese Communist dictator Mao Zedong, “We have one enemy (the US) and our forces must be joint.” During the conversation, Kosygin also stated, “What ties us together is greater than what keeps us apart.”[25] In 1965, Romanian ruler Nicolae Ceausescu stated to Deng Xiaoping, then a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo member and head of the Secretariat of the CCP, “…we understand that in case of a war against imperialism we will have to act in common...”[26] According to a record of conversation (1964), Premier Zhou Enlai told the Mongolian Ambassador that “…socialist countries could have disagreements, but that this was a secondary question, and in the struggle against imperialism socialist countries must be united, and this was the main thing. If imperialism attacked one socialist country, all socialist countries must come forward united in this struggle…”[27] The Chinese Ambassador to Cuba Shen Jian remarked to Fidel Castro in 1961, “There is a lot in common between the Cuban revolution and the Chinese revolution, accordingly, there will be similarities in problems we encounter and face.”[28] Mao Zedong noted in An Outline for a Speech on the International Situation in December 1959, “The basic interests of China and the Soviet Union have determined that after all these two great powers should unite. Where they don’t unite, it is only a temporary phenomenon, only one finger in ten.”[29] It is significant that the latter quote of Mao was made months before any of the ideological polemics between Moscow and Beijing. Was something being planned beforehand? Was Mao and Khrushchev preparing their inner circles for a potential long-range deception? It is hard to tell without additional data. Since the CCP and CPSU are highly compartmentalized and opaque, we will never know the full truth. However, these declassified statements point to the fact that the split was exaggerated (at best) and that Moscow and Beijing remained allies despite any ideological disputes.
After 1966, there was a complete dearth (as far as I am able to determine from my research) of statements of ideological solidarity between Beijing and Moscow. However, one declassified speech provided a clue that Beijing and Moscow were still aligned at least on certain critical issues. Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai noted in his March 1973 Report on the International Situation, “We cannot propose to unite with the US to oppose the USSR, though we share the same views with the US on certain issues.”[30] The thrust of this speech was repeated in a conversation between East German dictator Erich Honecker and North Korea’s Kim Il Sung. According to a declassified transcript of this meeting, Kim Il-Sung stated, “Given the complex world situation, I hope that the Soviet Union and China work things out. I believe that the development of relations with the US is not targeted against the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai already told me that when they established relations with the US. They told us every time they met with Japan and the US. The only objective of these relations is to obtain developed technology and credit from Japan and the US.”[31] A public broadcast by the USSR also “let the cat out of the bag.” A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast admitted in 1985 that “even in the most complicated periods, the CPSU and the Soviet government have never forgotten that the long range and fundamental interests of the Soviet Union and China are identical.”[32] Why are these statements/quotes significant? They are significant because:
1) They show China’s unwillingness to completely align with the United States.
2) The declassified transcript of the Honecker-Kim Il Sung conversation clearly illustrated the deceptive and opportunistic reason for Beijing’s opening to the US (the acquisition of high technology).
3) They also illustrated China’s unwillingness to engage in an irrevocable break with the Soviet Union.
4) The Radio Peace and Progress broadcast was a blatant admission of the strategic convergence of interests of China and Soviet Union. The “long range and fundamental interests” of the USSR and China was the defeat of the US and global revolution. Could it be anything else? Highly doubtful.
According to the dissident newspaper Cheng Ming (which maintained secret sources within the CCP leadership) the Soviet press simultaneously attacked the Chinese while relations between Moscow and Beijing were vastly improving. Ching Meng reported that this strategy was implemented in part to divert American attention away from the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.[33] This report, based on high level CCP sources, strongly hinted at a deception coordinated jointly by China and the Soviet Union. Why would the Soviets attack China while enhancing bilaterial relations?
1) To throw the US off balance, thus ensuring the continued flow of technology from American exporters and weapons sales.
2) To deceive the West into believing that the communist bloc was no longer monolithic. This is in line with the ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu’s dictum that: “All warfare is based on deception. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline. Simulated weakness postulates strength.”[34] The US would slack off in its preparedness in the face of an openly unified communist bloc. Beijing and Moscow could achieve an element of surprise if they launched a “One Clenched Fist” attack against the US. We would never suspect that the Soviets and Chinese (and their allies) could cooperate on intelligence matters. The US is blinded to these possibilities since we accept the bona fides of the split.
The revelations laid out in the Cheng Ming article was confirmed (at least regards to the two-faced Sino-Soviet policy) by Congressman Phil Crane (R-IL). He noted in respect to President Reagan’s trip to China (1984): “It’s interesting that when China censored the President’s speeches, it censored the things he said about Russia. This shows with whom the Red Chinese are really in bed.”[35]
By the late 1970s and certainly throughout the 1980s, China and the Eastern Bloc countries viewed themselves united in a common front against the United States. In a letter from the East German Communist Party (SED) Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), East Berlin asserted that once the phase of “neutralizing” China (through trade, scientific, athletic, and cultural ties) was over, Beijing would be included in “dealing the final blow to the imperialist enemy.”[36] Who is the “imperialist enemy?” The United States, of course. In the wake of Yugoslav dictator Josip Broz Tito’s visit (1977), Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua admitted that while “minor differences exist between our two nations we still have a common goal. We do this to achieve our objectives…”[37] What is their “common goal?” Overtaking the US. The theme of “common goals” continued throughout the late 1980s. In October 1985, Zhao Ziyang met with Daniel Ortega and declared that “China and Nicaragua belong to the Third World and share much in common.”[38] In a 1987 conversation with Chinese Communist dictator Deng Xiaoping, Bulgarian communist ruler Todor Zhivkov asserted that China and Bulgaria shared “common aims and ideals.”[39] In another meeting, Deng claimed that Bulgaria and China “share a common aim. We must make efforts together.”[40] The text of an Informational Note from the Official Visit in Poland of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Comrade Wu Xueqian (1987), read in part, “…one fundamental element which binds our countries is their political system and the common enemy.”[41] What is the “common aim?” Global communism. Who is the “common enemy?” The United States. By 1989/1990 (coincidentally the time of the Sino-Soviet rapprochement), the Vietnamese and Chinese healed their split. Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Agriculture Nguyen Van Phuoc claimed that “We don’t consider China as an enemy. We can learn many good things from China.”[42] In April 1990, the VCP General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh noted at a meeting of the Politburo: “Vietnam and China are both socialist countries that are both opposed to the imperialist plots aimed at eliminating socialism, so they must fight together against imperialism. The first thing that must be done is to develop and expand relations between our two countries. Other problems can be resolved later…”[43] Common aims and ideologies clearly can reunite rival brothers.
Even more significant are the tangible actions undertaken by China and the Soviet Union in areas of trade, foreign policy, and even military/intelligence support. As the old saying goes, “Actions speak louder than words.” China and the USSR were aligned in providing support for various communist countries, guerrilla, and terrorist movements. Sometimes this was done directly, while in other cases it was provided through third countries (like Romania). During the 1960s, China supplied 75-mm recoilless rifles and pistols to the Cubans.[44] During the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets and Chinese found themselves on the same side in supporting (with weapons and military training) North Vietnam (even during the 1972 American naval blockade of North Vietnamese ports).[45] Chinese railways and ports were used to transship Soviet weapons to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.[46] In fact, as early as March 1966, a Soviet Army colonel in charge of the transfers of weapons to North Vietnam via China “expressed no dissatisfaction with Chinese cooperation.”[47] According to the NSA, the Soviets passed intelligence data on American bombers to the Chinese, who then forwarded it to the North Vietnamese.[48] According to a Red Army Major, a KGB officer told him that an American POW was smuggled in 1967 through a “window” along the Sino-Soviet border normally used to move war booty from Indochina to the USSR.[49] This allegation was significant for the following reasons:
1) This collaboration occurred during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, which was directed against both the Soviet Union and the United States.
2) This collaboration occurred seven years after the split.
3) These exchanges involved highly specialized and sensitive military/intelligence collaboration (transfers of captured American technologies and POWs to the USSR). This is commonly believed to have ended in 1960.
According to Dr. Joseph D. Douglass Jr., the Chinese approached the Czechoslovaks to jointly exploit American POWs who were captured during the Vietnam War.[50] This was significant because it corroborates the tenor of the Red Army Major, who revealed cooperation in POW exploitation. The information revealed by Douglass and the Red Army Major provide credibility to the allegations of Soviet-Chinese cooperation on sensitive matters of technology and POW exploitation. After all, two sources were making similar allegations.
The Soviets also provided support to the fiercely Maoist/Stalinist Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Sometimes this was done openly while on other occasions, this support was channeled through countries allied to both Beijing and Moscow. During the 1960s, the Soviet and Chinese Embassies in Phnom Penh assisted the Khmer Rouge.[51] In October 1973, the Soviets opened a channel to the Khmer Rouge via China. The Khmer Rouge received arms from China, North Vietnam, Cuba, and North Korea.[52] The North Vietnamese provided critical support in the form of troops[53] and captured American-made artillery pieces[54] to the Khmer Rouge in April 1975 (when the anticommunist Lon Nol government was on the verge of defeat). The Soviets hinted at helping the Khmer Rouge. In an April 1975 broadcast, Radio Moscow admitted “…various socialist countries including the Soviet Union and progressive peoples throughout the world have provided all out aid and support to the just cause of the Cambodian people’s struggle for the freedom and independence of their fatherland.”[55] The Soviet Union, China[56], and Soviet bloc nations like East Germany[57] praised the Khmer Rouge’s seizure of the American merchant ship Mayaguez. Based on communications between Cambodia, China, and the Soviet Union, Moscow and Beijing reportedly encouraged the Khmer Rouge to seize the ship.[58] After the Khmer Rouge took over in April 1975, China and Czechoslovakia constructed an ammunition factory in Cambodia.[59] The North Koreans provided intelligence advisers to the Khmer Rouge in 1977.[60] By 1978, relations between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam/the USSR became extremely hostile, since Cambodia was governed by Chinese-aligned Stalinist-Maoists. The Khmer Rouge sought territorial revisions in the border areas with Vietnam, which helped split Hanoi and Phnom Penh apart. Before 1978, both the Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge maintained a common unity against the Americans. Starting in 1977, Cambodia’s security service Santebal (Keeper of the Peace) purged agents supposedly aligned with the Soviet KGB, American CIA, the Vietnamese, and the old Lon Nol government and its rebels operating from Thailand. A clash between Cambodia and Vietnam became inevitable where the USSR and China had to choose sides. This seemingly (and legitimately) proved the existence of real dissensions within the Sino-Soviet communist world. However, real fissures can be healed as global events and circumstances change. In 2000, the Khmer Rouge reportedly used hard currency from the sale of gemstones and logs to Hun Sen (who led the pro-Vietnamese Cambodian People’s Party or CPP) to purchase land and farms in Communist Cuba. Former Khmer Rouge Foreign Minister Ieng Sary used to visit Cuba once or twice a year via China and Vietnam.[61] Old hatred for Vietnam was transformed into renewing old albeit covert ties with Hanoi and Havana.
China supplied other countries and movements aligned with Moscow with weapons and military training. After all, the US remained an enemy, despite Washington foolishly conferring Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status in 1979. During the 1980s, the Chinese and North Koreans attempted to ship weapons to Filipino communist New People’s Army (NPA).[62] During the late 1980s, the Chinese trained special NPA assassins responsible for killing US military officers stationed in the Philippines.[63] During the 1980s, China trained and provided artillery and ammunition to Palestine Liberation Movement (PLO) terrorists.[64] The rockets launched twice by the FMLN against the US Embassy in San Salvador (1980) were secretly imported from China.[65] Ferman Cienfuegos, the head of foreign relations for the FMLN informed Robert Leiken that the organization was opening relations with China. In fact, Cienfuegos told Leiken that the FMLN planned to dispatch a delegation to China in 1982.[66] In 1982, China began training Congolese military personnel in Beijing.[67] During the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese provided millions of dollars of weapons (such as rifles) to the Ethiopian communist military dictatorship.[68] This was confirmed by the Ethiopian governmental defector Dawit Wolde Giorgis, who revealed that “the Chinese shipped substantial amounts of small arms (to Ethiopia), but were reluctant to give heavy weapons…”[69] Initially, the Ethiopians used China as an intermediary to acquire captured American-made weapons from Vietnam.[70] Why was this significant? China served as an intermediary in an effort to bolster a pro-Soviet dictatorship (Ethiopia in this case). Secondly, Ethiopia possessed vast stores of US-made weapons leftover from the pro-American absolute monarchy of Emperor Haile Selassie I. Ethiopia needed spare parts for these weapons and Vietnam (through China) was willing to ship them. By the late 1980s the Chinese sold weapons to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) dictatorship.[71] A Southwest African Peoples’s Liberation Organization (SWAPO) delegation led by Sam Nujoma met with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, who admitted in 1983 that: “We have not only supported you politically and morally, but also provided as much material assistance as we can. No matter what changes in the world situation, China will remain firm in supporting your just cause.”[72]
Throughout the 1980s, China also repaired official relations with pro-Soviet communist parties. China renewed its contacts with the Moscow-line South African Communist Party (SACP) and even resumed funding of that organization, along with the African National Congress (ANC).[73] SACP leader Joe Slovo visited China in September 1986 and restored party- to-party ties. Just before visiting China, Slovo requested a briefing from the CPSU’s International Department, which traveled to Lusaka to assist the SACP delegation in re-opening relations with Beijing.[74] This clearly indicates either:
1) Sino-Soviet coordination in slowly repairing relations with the Moscow-line world communist movement. This clearly proves that splits are not always permanent.
2) Moscow and Beijing were slowly signaling that they were dropping their façade of a split.
Communist Party USA (CPUSA) Chairman Gus Hall visited the PRC (June 1988) and restored party to party ties with the Chinese Communist Party. He met with Hu Qili, a theoretician of the Chinese Communist Party and member of the Politburo.[75] A delegation of the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department visited East Germany in November 1989[76] presumably to renew Party-to-Party cooperation. This cooperation was seen as a defeat for the US. The Workers World Party (WWP) observed, “No matter how much the imperialists are trying to conceal their disappointment, rapprochement among the socialist countries is a direct rebuff to the main element in imperialist foreign policy.” The WWP believed that the Sino-Soviet rapprochement would “stimulate a new chapter in the anti-imperialist struggle against the U.S., Japan, and the other imperialist countries.”[77] The Vietnamese Communist Party newspaper Nhan Dan noted in May 1989 that the Sino-Soviet rapprochement “benefits not only the peoples of the USSR and China but also peace and security in the world. It also helps improve the atmosphere in Asia and the Pacific.” Such a development “wins the sympathy from the public at large in various countries.”[78]
By the early 1980s, there were scattered reports of military/intelligence cooperation between China and the countries of the Eastern Bloc. In 1978, the Chinese intelligence agencies revamped their regional base in Yugoslavia.[79] Why was this significant?
1) China never fully repaired its breech with Yugoslavia after Josip Broz Tito (its communist dictator) had his bona fide breech with Stalin in 1948.
2) This showed that open splits could be healed in pursuit of common interests (against the West and the US).
Beijing also engaged in military and intelligence cooperation with the staunchest Soviet allies within the Warsaw Pact. China dispatched several units of the People’s Armed Police to Poland where they received anti-riot training.[80] In July/August 1981, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee officials (Chen Dexing, Deputy Head of the Sector USSR and Eastern European Countries in the Department of International Relations of the CCP Central Committee, and Du Kening, official in the same department) toured East Germany and posed questions regarding East Berlin’s “defense against ideological subversion from the West” and “developments in the People’s Republic of Poland, coupled with the advice one should learn from the mistakes made in the PR Poland.”[81] Did cooperation between the East German and Chinese intelligence materialize as a result of this meeting? The document does not indicate either way. However, such collaboration cannot be discounted given the tone of the document’s text. Herf reported that East Germany forged military cooperation agreements with China (along with its open allies in the Third World and Eastern Europe).[82] A Chinese report from 1984 extolled “the friendly relations” between the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Romanian army.[83] During the early 1980s, Chinese intelligence officials travelled to Belgrade to enhance ties with Yugoslav intelligence. These ties continued throughout the rule of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and its leader Slobodan Milosevic.[84] By the late 1980s, the state press organs in China and the Warsaw Pact countries all openly reported instances of military cooperation, joint meetings, and assistance agreements. In an October 1988 visit to Hungary, the Chinese Defense Minister Qin Jiwei reported “relations between armed forces of China and Hungary have expanded rapidly in recent years. This is not only in the fundamental interests of the two peoples, but also conducive to world peace.” Lt.-General Pacsek of the Hungarian People’s Army expressed the hope for co-operation in military education, training, and industry to his Chinese counterparts.[85] When Daniel Ortega and the Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Defense visited China during the mid-1980s, they met with top Chinese PLA military officers, including the Chief of Staff.[86] In December 1984, China dispatched resident military attaches to Cuba, which was the re-initiation of friendly military contacts.[87] Throughout the 1980s, the Chinese maintained military and intelligence cooperation with Romania,[88] Yugoslavia[89], and North Korea.[90] Once the USSR and PRC officially healed their split in May 1989, Eastern Bloc military and intelligence contacts with China became quite open. An East German Stasi delegation visited China in September 1989, where they were wined and dined in first class hotels. The East Germans held discussions with their counterparts in the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) on their capabilities.[91] In September 1989, East Germany and China inked an agreement which forged relationships between the political officers of the PLA and the East German National People’s Army (NVA).[92] These contacts between the East German and Chinese armed forces increased under the regime of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) Chairman (and “reformist” leader) Egon Krenz.[93] By 1989, Czechoslovakia restored direct military contacts with the Chinese PLA. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and its military leadership proposed to the Chinese cooperation in the fields of combat training, military education, and the exchange of military specialists.[94] Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense Milan Vaclavik visited China in the autumn of 1989 and met with Chinese Defense Minister Qin Jiwei. The Chinese PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Xu Xin visited Czechoslovakia in October 1989 and met with Gustav Husak (the President of Czechoslovakia) along with the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People’s Army.[95] While presiding over a November 1989 meeting between Party officials and military commanders of both Czechoslovakia and China, General Secretary Gustav Husak asserted his support for Beijing’s “safeguarding socialism and maintaining world peace.” Husak added further that Czechoslovakia “cherishes its relations with China and hopes to further overall cooperation with China.”[96] An August 1989 agreement between the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs pledged a strengthening of “technical exchanges.”[97] A Xinhua report of a September 1989 meeting between high-ranking Bulgarian People’s Army officers and Chinese PLA General Guo Linxiang claimed that “the friendship between the armies of the two countries will be further strengthened.” Xinhua also noted that the Bulgarians and Chinese “shared the view that the restoration of military exchanges between the two countries will be beneficial to the modernization and regularization of the armies of both countries.”[98] High level military contacts between China and Cuba started with the August 1989 meeting between General Chi Haotian (Chief of the General Staff of the PLA) and Cuban Major-General Moises Sio Wong, who was Director of the State Reserve Institute of Cuba, which maintained the material needs for the state and army.[99] In an April 1990 meeting between PLA General Chi Haotian and Lt.-General Ulises Rosales (the Chief of General Staff of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces) in Beijing admitted to already existing ties between the Chinese and Cuban armies, adding the wish that such cooperation “will continue to grow in the days to come.”[100]
Even after the start of the Sino-Soviet “split,” Moscow continued to export weapons to the Chinese PLA. Soviet weapons sent to China included twenty MIG-21 jet fighters (exported in 1961), four SS-C-2b coastal defense systems (exported in 1963), twenty four SS-C-2b Samlet coastal defense missiles (1963), one hundred SS-N-2 Styx surface to surface missiles mounted on vessels (exported from 1960 to 1963), four Komar fast attack craft, and four Osa I class missile boats.[101] By 1964, it appeared that these weapons transfers ceased. There is a possibility that certain countries allied with Moscow and Beijing were used as cutouts for exports of spare parts and arms. Romania provided computers[102] and MIG-21 jet engines to China.[103] Romania was aligned with both China and the Soviet Union, despite its image as a maverick state within the Warsaw Pact.
China also collaborated with the USSR and some of its Warsaw Pact allies to ship weapons to various clients and adversaries (in exchange for hard currency presumably). In 1985, the Chinese, using a Soviet ship (despite the “split,”) transported weapons to South Africa through Zaire.[104] According to IMES (an East German foreign trade corporation) documents, the communist Hungarian arms dealer Ferenc Nemethy procured sensitive West German dual use technologies in 1988 and had them shipped to East Germany through China.[105]
The exchange of high technology items related to potential military development was another area where Beijing and Moscow collaborated. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies continued to export strategic goods useful for Chinese war industries and the PLA. These exports included chemicals, trucks, ball bearings, marine engines, no-ferrous ores, machinery, machine tools, helicopters, nuclear power plants, lathes, and passenger aircraft.[106] Czechoslovakia refined Chinese uranium,[107] while China imported precision equipment from Czechoslovakia and East Germany for their atomic bomb program.[108] China even shipped tungsten (a strategic metal) directly to the Soviet Union.[109] In 1969, East German Stasi General Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski argued that China (along with India, North Korea, and Cuba) could be sources for cheap energy for East Germany.[110] During the 1980s, the East Germans sought to develop a semiconductor industry and proposed to work with China (along with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan).[111] In December 1989, the Chinese and East Germans concluded a barter trade agreement where East Berlin would exchange tramcars, trucks, machine tools, and construction machinery for Chinese garments, chemicals, rice, soya beans, and metallic concentrates.[112] During the 1980s, the Chinese provided the Soviets with hard currency loans. In one instance the Bank of China was a lead participant in November 1984 of a loan of $50 million for the Soviet Narodny Bank.[113] Hard currency loans:
1) Allow China to fund its military modernization and intelligence operations.
2) Allow China to purchase industrial machinery and other technologies potentially used for rearmament.
3) Keeps its economy afloat.
The USSR, China, and their allies were also used as transit points for their personnel and Western leftists to travel to their respective destinations. A purser for the state-owned Cubana Airlines Salvador del Pino recalled that “Of those coming to Cuba from Prague, 90% are military men from North Vietnam and Red China.”[114] American Maoists and New Leftists traveled through the Soviet Union to meet with intelligence contacts in China. They would receive their orders and return to the US ready to implement subversive actions.[115]
The Soviets and Chinese also found themselves on the same side during key votes in the United Nations (UN) and other foreign policy matters. The Soviets welcomed and voted for the 1971 expulsion of Taiwan from the UN and the accession of China.[116] Moscow opposed the original American plan of admitting both Taiwan and China to the UN. The Soviets would have hotly opposed this, with Pravda calling for “the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Chinese People’s Republic in the United Nations and the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shekists.”[117] Izvestia noted, “…No matter how our relations with the Chinese leader evolved-as is known they have deteriorated through no fault of our own-the Soviet Union, true to the internationalist principles of its Leninist foreign policy always proceeded from the fact that the Chinese people could not be ignored and had to be represented in the United Nations.”[118] Why was this significant?
1) Moscow made a critical gesture which legitimized the PRC as a sovereign state at the expense of an American ally.
2) It signaled to the world that the Soviets would at bare minimum stand idly by in the event China invaded and occupied Taiwan (Republic of China).
Allies of Moscow also aligned with China on the 1971 expulsion of Taiwan from the UN. Chile (under the pro-Soviet President Allende) backed China’s 1971 entry into the UN and the ejection of Taiwan.[119] Other Soviet allies hailed Nixon’s trip to Beijing as evidence of the weakening of American anti-communism. The Communist Party USA (CPUSA) hailed Nixon’s renewal of relations with China in 1971, dubbing it a “break in the wall.”[120] North Korea’s Kim Il Sung proclaimed that “Nixon’s visit to China will not be a march of a victor but a trip of the defeated and it fully reflects the destiny of United States imperialism, which is like a sun sinking into Western sky.”[121] Kim elaborated further that the American “opening” to Beijing created “confusion” within the “US ruling class and its allies and puppets…”[122] Ultimately, the weakening of American anticommunism was more important than conflict over specific doctrines. This was the “red thread” (a term coined by defecting Czechoslovak Major General Jan Sejna) which united Beijing and Moscow.
China was not averse to praising takeovers by Soviet-aligned (and funded) movements and figures in the Third World. After Salvador Allende was elected President of Chile in 1970, Zhou En-Lai declared: “Cuba was in the 1960s, Allende was in the 70s, and the backyard of US was not calm anymore.” Zhou cabled his congratulations to Allende, declaring “the Chinese government and the Chinese people firmly support the Chilean people to struggle against imperialist aggression, plundering, and interference, to safeguard the national independence and national sovereignty, and we wish the Chilean people a new victory in this struggle.”[123] According to the former American Ambassador to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan, China voted against the United States 86% of the time, thus placing Beijing “in the same column as the Soviet Union.”[124] In another study, China was found to have voted against the United States’ position over 70% of the time.[125] During the 1980s, the Chinese denounced Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program.[126] In May 1985, the Federation of China Trade Unions sent a telegram to the Sandinista Workers Central Trade Union where it declared its solidarity with “Nicaraguan workers in their just struggle for national independence and against US interference.”[127]
Declassified documents show that Soviet dictator Mikhail Gorbachev sought to restore the alliance with China. Perhaps he was slowly dropping the mask of deception or proving that splits between brother communist countries could be easily repaired. In November 1985, Gorbachev himself noted “We need to wage our struggle for China patiently and persistently, for a rapprochement with it. This is very important from the point of view of (our) country’s prospects…”[128] A secret CPSU Central Committee resolution (September 1986) called for the Soviets to ally with China to combat US “neoglobalism”: “Insofar as there are signs that the Chinese leadership also appears disturbed by the dangerous actions of Reagan’s neoglobalism, attempts could be made to initiate a dialogue on this problem with the Chinese, starting, perhaps, on the level of scholars.”[129] While discussing the PRC at a Politburo meeting, Gorbachev stated “One has to understand the Chinese. They have a right to become a great power, we should not call it ‘chauvinism.’” Gorbachev urged his comrades to talk “respectfully” about China. He was impressed with China’s economic progress and believed that, like India, it was “getting stronger—everyone can see it.”[130] According to declassified documents, Gorbachev saw an alliance with China as a counterweight to American power. Gorbachev explained to the Portuguese Communist Party leader Alvaro Cunhal that the Americans “are literally shaking over the signs of improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and rapprochement between the USSR and India. They are doing everything possible to prevent the creation of such a triangle in Asia. Indeed, over two billion people live in these three countries—the USSR, India, and China. They have a huge potential.”[131] Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (who was pro-Soviet) saw the Soviet-Chinese-Indian “triangle” as a tool to oppose “the challenge of the US-EEC-Japan grouping.”[132] According to Radchenko, the purpose of this “triangle” was the creation of what he referred to as an “anti-American entente.”[133]
Contrary to what observers may expect the Soviets cautiously supported Beijing’s crushing of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. The Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies declared in June 1989 that “the events happening in China are an internal affair of the country. Any attempts of pressure from outside would be inappropriate. Such attempts only blow up passions but do not promote stabilization of the situation.”[134] A columnist for the CPSU newspaper Pravda stated June 8, 1989: “The use of force to maintain public order is a measure as extreme as amputating a sick man’s leg. It always hurts; it is always undesirable. But it is sometimes necessary to save a human life. Crowd elements easily become a weapon in the hands of evil forces. We in the USSR, alas, have such examples here. It seems that in connection with the tragic events of Tiananmen Square, none of us can play role of prosecutor or defense, because the image of armored vehicles at the crossroads touches one of our sensitive nerves.”[135] Pravda dismissively noted, “It appears that in an attempt to exploit the current situation in order to put pressure on the government, the students have lost the support of many people who sympathized with them.”[136]
Allies of Moscow and Beijing chimed in and supported the Tiananmen Square repression. Cuba backed the Chinese crackdown when the Cuban foreign minister commended Chinese authorities for “defeating the counterrevolutionary acts.”[137] In April 1990, North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung praised the Chinese army’s crushing of “the anti-revolutionary riot last year.”[138] China’s stalwart ally in the Warsaw Pact, Romania, also supported the Chinese actions in Tiananmen Square.[139] A headline emblazoned on the East German magazine Young World screamed, “See the handiwork of counter-revolutionaries who are endangering socialism in China.”[140] In fact, the East Germans referred to the massacre in Tiananmen Square as the “putting-down of a counter-revolution.”[141] Czechoslovakia also supported the Chinese massacre. In response, the Chinese “highly valued the understanding shown by the Czechoslovak Communist Party and people” for suppressing the “anti-socialist” riots in Beijing.[142] Burmese SLORC member Lt-General Khin Nyunt asserted after the massacre, “We sympathize with the People’s Republic of China as disturbances similar to those in Burma last year broke out in the People’s Republic.”[143] The Speaker of the People’s National Congress (PNC)-controlled Guyanese National Assembly Sase Narain visited Red China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre. He remarked that “I believe the Chinese government can make correct judgments of its internal affairs and do things in line with the interest of the people.” [144] (The PNC was the ruling Marxist party in Guyana). Burkina Faso military ruler Capt. Blaise Compaore also supported the Chinese massacre of students, stating “this premeditated unrest was a concrete manifestation of the reactionary political forces’ intention to make the socialist countries abandon socialism and put them under the shackle of the world monopoly capitalism.”[145] In July 1989, Workers Party of Ethiopia Politburo member Shimelis Mazengia stated to Chinese Communist Central Committee Secretary Jiang Zemin, “We are glad to see that China has brought the situation under control.” He was of course referring to the Chinese PLA repression of the student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.[146] Even erstwhile enemies of China banded together in communist solidarity in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Unity against the forces of imperialism and capitalism take precedence over any existing sectarian differences in the socialist family. The Vietnamese state radio noted that the Chinese PLA could not have stopped the Tiananmen Square massacre after “hooligans and ruffians insulted or beat up soldiers” and destroyed military vehicles.[147] During a meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, the Iranians expressed their “understanding of China’s firm stand” towards the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and supported Beijing’s efforts to restore order and stability.[148] The PLO’s UN Mission told an associate of lawyer Alan Dershowitz that the Tiananmen Square massacre was an “an internal problem. We are not going to get involved.”[149] Some within the American communist movement also supported China’s Tiananmen Square crackdown. Mick Kelly, a leading member of the Freedom Road Socialist Organization (FRSO), argued in Continuing the Revolution is Not a Dinner Party (1989) that the defeat of the Tiananmen Square protestors signified an important defeat for counterrevolution and capitalist restoration in socialist countries and prevented the overthrow of socialism in China.[150] The Workers World Party justified the Chinese PLA’s massacre at Tiananmen Square as the suppression of a “violent counter-revolutionary rebellion.” Gus Hall, the CPUSA Chairman, complained that the “US and world capitalism and their media mouthpieces” for “using the student protests to push the ideas that socialism is hopelessly anti-democratic, that the Communist Party is hopelessly bureaucratic and insensitive to people’s needs and desires.” Hall claimed that the student demonstrators could not attract Chinese workers to their cause. He claimed that the Chinese Communist Party imposed martial law to forestall “anarchy and chaos.”[151]
Relations between the CCP and CPSU were officially healed during the Beijing summit of May 1989 between Gorbachev and Deng. Both seemed to hint a desire to build a global (presumably communist) order. During the summit, Gorbachev admitted that China and the Soviet Union shared “unanimous” and “identical” views.[152] A Pravda article dated from February 1989 declared that China and the Soviet Union had a “special responsibility” to create a “new world political order.”[153] The Chinese newspaper Rinman Ribao stated in May 1989 that Sino-Soviet foreign policy would oppose “hegemony” and create a “new international political order” on a “step by step” basis.[154] However, one could never be too forthright about the implications of this alliance. Why? Because it could concern the US. Chinese Premier Li Peng told Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze that “In the normalization of relations, we must do without euphoria, so that it does not cause concern on the part of other countries.”[155]
Both Moscow and Beijing agreed that “reforms” were a tool to challenge and overtake capitalism. CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang told Gorbachev: “The advantages of socialism can show only through reforms. Only they can show its attractive force. We must respond to the challenge of capitalism. We have no other way out but to follow on the road of reforms.”[156] At this point, the desires of both the CCP and the CPSU was to outflank the US. Pravda observed in 1989 that China and the Soviet Union could redeploy troops to “other areas” away from their common border, which caused concerns at the Defense Department. Pravda noted: “It will no longer be possible for the United States to count on Beijing’s support in the event of an outbreak of Soviet-US confrontation. The future policies of Japan, South Korea, the ASEAN countries, Australia, and New Zealand, in the light of the USSR-PRC reconciliation, are provoking unpleasant thoughts in Washington. Will the U.S. allies and friends in Asia and the Pacific reassess their values?”[157] In other words, Moscow and Beijing sought a neutralization of East Asia. The spirit of this strategy seemed to be confirmed by a defecting PRK[158] diplomat Chhin Sun-An, who warned, “The national reconciliation policy of the Phnom Penh government did not come from the goodwill of Hanoi and Phnom Penh. It was the result of Soviet pressure…Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa once told the Phnom Penh government that it should talk with the Khmer Rouge so that the USSR could reduce Chinese-Soviet tension and isolate the USA.”[159]
Soviet-Chinese plans, meetings, and joint statements matched with their actions. A delegation from the Chinese Institute of Current International Affairs (which was, according to the Soviets, tied with the “highest political leadership and organs of state security of the PRC”) visited the Soviet Institute for US and Canadian Studies (upon invitation from them).[160] It is well-known that the Institute for US and Canadian Studies was closely tied to the KGB. Considering these facts, it could be reasonably concluded that this meeting could have served as a cover for intelligence cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. In September 1989, a delegation of the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament visited the USSR and met with the Soviet Peace Committee where “utterly specific understandings have been achieved on implementing cooperation.”[161] Direct military cooperation soon followed. In November 1989, Chinese Foreign and Defense Ministry officials visited the USSR and discussed “strengthening mutual trust and other issues.”[162] PRC diplomats resident in Washington reported that Soviet representatives were among the only guests at a 1989 Chinese Embassy reception which honored the PLA.[163] The USSR decided to resume direct weapons exports to China in December 1989.[164] The Soviets exported SU-24 and SU-27 combat aircraft to China in late 1990.[165] According to documents smuggled out of China, the Central Committee of the CCP called for the development of a “new socialist ‘alliance circle’ comprising the five nations of China, the USSR, North Korea, Mongolia and Vietnam.”[166] During these exchanges, the Soviets agreed to provide heavy weapons to the Chinese at exorbitantly low prices. These weapons were diverted from arsenals used by Soviet troops previously stationed in Eastern Europe. Chinese pilots, officers, and paratroops were sent to Soviet military academies for training.[167] In order to prepare for what was termed “future wars,” the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee launched a plan to build up the air force, in part by dispatching pilots to the USSR for training.[168] These “future wars” would more than likely involve Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. Sometimes this cooperation had sinister aspects. In August 1990, the Soviets forcibly repatriated a defecting Chinese pilot back to China, where he faced a future of certain imprisonment or execution.[169] Beijing continued its export of weapons to anti-US dictatorships all over the world. At an October 1991 meeting of the PLA’s General Logistics Department and General Staff, China’s President Yang Shangkun stated that Beijing’s rejuvenated alliance with the Soviet Union was directed against the United States. According to an account of this meeting, Yang’s speech revealed that the “…has continued to export arms after the Gulf war. Because of the Most-Favoured-Nation status problem (with the US), it has not been doing it overtly and openly but on the sly.” Why was this statement significant? It was an admission that Beijing adopted a two-faced policy towards the US. The CCP sought to export weapons abroad (for hard currency and to shore up anti-American governments) while being mindful (even scared of) losing its crucial benefits of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status with the US. According to the insider account of this meeting, “The CCP thought it could use the Soviet Union as a chip by striking a pose of Sino-Soviet alliance in bargaining with the USA.” Why was this significant? This pointed to the CCP’s alignment with the USSR as a means of opposing the US. According to the insider, a high-ranking official from the General Logistics Department revealed that the “CCP remains firm in exporting arms because it wants to counteract the USA and hostile Western forces. Obviously, China’s insistence on exporting arms to Pakistan, Iraq and other countries is aimed at opposing US power politics, apart from earning foreign exchange.” The same high-ranking official noted: “Our support for Iraq (under Saddam Hussein) is our attempt to build anti-US bases in the Middle East.”[170] Public statements confirmed the resurrection of the Sino-Soviet alliance. In a June 1991 meeting of Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chinese Communist Party delegations, General Secretary Jiang Zemin noted that “friendly and good-neighbourly relations between China and the Soviet Union is in the interest of world peace and stability.”[171] Economic cooperation (which was never completely severed in 1960) deepened after May 1989. In July 1989, the Chinese reportedly established factories in the Soviet Union to produce machines and soya bean products for export back to China and distribution in the Soviet domestic market.[172] The Soviets even worked on behalf of their newfound Chinese allies to lift the sanctions that were imposed in the wake of Tiananmen Square. A transcript of the meeting between Gorbachev and President George H.W. Bush (November 1990) was very revealing for the following reasons:
1) The USSR worked on behalf of China to lift sanctions, which boosts the legitimacy and economic modernization of the CCP regime. In the conversation, Gorbachev bluntly told Bush, “I think you should lift your sanctions against China.”
2) Bush was far more sympathetic to the CCP’s interests. He stated to Gorbachev, “I have vetoed Congress resolutions against China and I’ve managed to defend my position so far.” Bush also stated, “…if you talk to the Chinese tell them that our administration is persistently seeking a normalization of relations. Solidarity in the UN framework would help us to do even more in this respect.” The last sentence was advice on how to build a coalition in the UN to lift sanctions on Beijing.
3) Bush expressed a sort of frustration, even contempt for our system of checks and balances all for the cause of buttressing the CCP. After agreeing with Gorbachev on lifting sanctions on China, Bush also stated (quite significantly): “Actually I agree with you but under our crazy system…[173]
4) This proved that Bush was not a friend of the anticommunist cause or human rights.
5) This proved that the USSR advocated for China on key foreign trade/diplomatic issues.
Both countries engaged in mutual praise of each other’s achievements and goals. In October 1989, the hardline Chinese Beijing Daily claimed that communism in the Soviet Union allowed it to attain the status of having the second highest GNP in the world. Furthermore, the article claimed that Marxism-Leninism allowed China to surpass many Western countries in the production of coal, steel, and oil. The Beijing Daily even claimed with revolutionary fervor that “Communism will gain certain victory.”[174]
Despite the end of the Cold War, the Sino-Russian alliance expanded by leaps and bounds. Open and secret partnership agreements were signed by Beijing and Moscow. In April 1996, Boris Yeltsin declared “a long term strategic partnership” with China.[175] In September 1992, a secret intelligence cooperation agreement was concluded between the Russian SVR/GRU and the Military Intelligence Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).[176] In August 1993, Russia and China signed an agreement on military technological cooperation.[177] Starting in 2001, Russian forces conducted massive military exercises with Chinese troops. During that year, China and Russia simulated a nuclear attack on US forces in Asia in retaliation for American support for Taiwan.[178] Joint Russian-Chinese exercises involving nuclear weapons, airpower, naval power, and massive numbers of ground troops continued throughout the Bush and Obama years.[179] In fact, an unnamed Bush Administration official commented in 2005 that the goal of these exercises was to intimidate the US into withdrawing its bases from Asia.[180] These exercises continue to this day. In fact, the joint Sino-Russian Vostok exercise of 2018 was the largest since 1991.[181] Putin noted in October 2020 that “Without any doubt, our cooperation with China is bolstering the defense capability of China’s army.”[182] Even more sinister was the secret planning of a Red Dawn invasion of the US. After defecting in 1992, GRU Colonel Stanislav Lunev warned how the Russian General Staff revised the old Soviet war plan against the United States. Per an agreement with Communist China, Beijing was tasked with the invasion of the lower 48 states, while Alaska would be annexed by the Russians. According to Lunev, ICBMs from the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces would decimate our Command and Control centers and major strategic assets (ICBM silos, naval bases, Strategic Air Command facilities, etc.). Various Third World nations (presumably anti-US allies of Russia and China) would be invited in for what the Russian war planners referred to as “looting rights.”[183] Another source corroborated Colonel Lunev’s revelations. In a secret speech to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CCP), People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Chi Haotian stated: “Over these years, according to Comrade Xiaoping’s arrangement, a large piece of our territory in the North has been given up to Russia; do you really think our Party Central Committee is a fool?”[184] When General Chi mentioned the “territory in the North,” he was referring to the US.
Sino-Russian collaboration exists today in the form of Moscow’s war against Ukraine. China provided arms, goods, and political support to Moscow. Intelligence passed by the US to China on Russian invasion plans of Ukraine were then passed by Beijing to Putin’s intelligence apparatus. The US (foolishly) believed that Beijing could persuade Russia to call off its plans to invade Ukraine. The Chinese claimed that the US “was trying to sow discord—and that China would not try to impede Russian plans and actions.”[185] (Great job President Biden & Company!)
Since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, the Russians requested weapons and other forms of assistance from China.[186] Ramzan Kadyrov, the brutal leader of Russia’s Chechnya region, confirmed that the Russian and Chechen military received Chinese-made Tigr armored personnel carriers from China.[187] Organs of the state-owned Chinese media and the Communist Party press explicitly took the side of the Russians during its war with Ukraine. Beijing’s propaganda media utilized Russian sources such as RT for its reporting. [188] Beijing’s propaganda also echoed the most audacious Russian claims regarding the Americans in Ukraine. The Chinese echoed their Russian allies and accused the US of operating “dangerous” biological warfare labs in Ukraine.[189] China censored pro-Ukraine websites and portrayed the Russian military invasion as anti-Western, anti-NATO, and anti-Nazi. Chinese media portrayed Ukraine and the United States as fascist countries and Kiev’s soldiers allegedly torturing captured Russian POWs. One Weibo (Chinese Internet source) commenter wrote on the Sputnik website: “We must stand with Russia! If Russia falls, NATO and the neo-Nazi United States will bully China!”[190] Chinese Internet commenters called the Russian leader “Putin the Great,” “the best legacy of the former Soviet Union” and “the greatest strategist of this century.” The Chinese commenters criticized Russian antiwar protestors, claiming they were brainwashed by the US. One Weibo user wrote “If I were Russian, Putin would be my faith, my light.” Another Weibo user wrote “This is an exemplary speech of war mobilization.” Chinese spokeswoman Hua Chunying noted, “When the U.S. drove five waves of NATO expansion eastward all the way to Russia’s doorstep and deployed advanced offensive strategic weapons in breach of its assurances to Russia, did it ever think about the consequences of pushing a big country to the wall?”[191]
In conclusion, the evidence clearly points to the seriousness and depth of the Sino-Russian relationship and its threat against the long-term survival of American interests. Despite the split between Beijing and Moscow (1960-1989), open and covert cooperation continued in areas of mutual interest (which are often at odds with the United States). Despite the US playing the “China Card” against the USSR, collaboration between the two communist powers not only continued, but deepened. This should serve as a lesson for those who seek to detach and use the “Russia Card” against the People’s Republic of China. Both are committed to a deep rooted, fundamental anti-Americanism. Our next question (like in many of my essays on Substack) is: How should the United States handle this challenge? This is admittedly a “tall order,” given the degradation of our industry, military, and the willful blindness of much of our policy making elite. Returning to an elaboration of solutions, Radical Civic Nationalists would undertake the following:
1) A final break with the Kissingerian notion that the US could play one authoritarian anti-US government against another. Our adversaries have proven themselves less naïve and have turned our stupidity and corruption against our country. Hence, the exercise of Kissinger/Metternich style of Realpolitik is an ineffective tool to be deployed against any totalitarian power.
2) Re-industrialization of the US in order to restore the “Arsenal of Democracy” to protect the continental United States from a Sino-Russian attack.
3) Massive investments in the appropriate weapons systems and civil defense to protect the US.
4) Slowly weaning the US from its intense economic interdependence with Beijing, Moscow (largely achieved after February 2022), and their allies (notably Vietnam). As I have written in previous essays on Substack, this will have to be gingerly applied over the long term, lest we provoke a catastrophic attack from the Sino-Russian bloc. A national consensus and a long-term strategic plan for achieving this goal needs to be forged.
5) We need to provide support for our allies (specifically Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Western Europe) in case of a Sino-Russian attack. This support has to be within our immediate capabilities, since we need to avoid depleting our own resources in order to avoid weapons and ammunition shortages necessary to repel an attack on the US homeland.
6) Beefing up existing airbases and naval ports within allied countries (mentioned above) or in the immediate vicinity.
What are your opinions and ideas? Did this paper change your mind on the nature of Sino-Russian relations during the Cold War and the period afterwords? Please feel free to share your comments.
[1] Robert Scheer With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War (Vintage Books, 1983) page 242.
[2] East-West Technology Transfer: A Congressional Dialog with the Reagan Administration: a Dialog (US Government Printing Office 1984) page 123.
[3] “Soviet Russia Inside Out” Accessed From:
[4] Victor Riesel “Meany Hits President’s China Plans” Buffalo (NY) Courier-Express Quoted in Congressional Record August 6, 1971 Accessed From: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Congressional_Record/goF9w0jocLgC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=%22victor+riesel%22+%22china%22&pg=PA30842&printsec=frontcover
[5] Stephen Webbe “Conservative scholars’ view of China economy disputed” Christian Science Monitor May 12, 1981 page 10.
[6] Teng Hsiao-ping Speech Behind the Scenes of Red China’s Foreign Policy The Chan Wang Publication Service September 30, 1978 pages 1-5.
[7] Teng Hsiao-ping Speech Behind the Scenes of Red China’s Foreign Policy The Chan Wang Publication Service September 30, 1978 pages 1-5.
[8] Teng Hsiao-ping Speech Behind the Scenes of Red China’s Foreign Policy (The Chan Wang Publication Service September 30, 1978) pages 6-11.
[9] Teng Hsiao-ping Speech Behind the Scenes of Red China’s Foreign Policy (The Chan Wang Publication Service September 30, 1978) pages 12-19.
[10] Teng Hsiao-ping Speech Behind the Scenes of Red China’s Foreign Policy (The Chan Wang Publication Service September 30, 1978) pages 12-19.
[11] Kubek, Anthony. Red China Papers: What Americans Deserve to Know About U.S.-Chinese Relations (Arlington House 1975) Accessed From:
[12] “French Expert Warning West Against Naïve Policy Toward Peiping” Central News Agency April 3, 1985
[13] M.E. Sarotte “China’s Fear of Contagion: Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example” International Security Volume 37 Number 2 Fall 2012 page 178.
[14] Brooke Singman “Pompeo’s Sochi summit could help drive ‘wedge’ between Russia, China” Fox News Accessed From: https://www.foxnews.com/politics/pompeos-sochi-summit-could-help-drive-wedge-between-russia-china-source
[15] “Russian Strategic Intentions” May 2019 Accessed From: https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000016b-a5a1-d241-adff-fdf908e00001
[16] “Nuclear Weapons Expert Dr. Peter Pry” PBD Podcast Episode 155 May 10, 2022 Accessed From:
[17] See Pyne’s article outlining his spheres of influence plan at Pyne, David T. “To Counter Russia and China, Make ‘Spheres of Influence’ Great Again” The National Interest October 11, 2021 Accessed From: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/counter-russia-and-china-make-%E2%80%98spheres-influence%E2%80%99-great-again-194982
[18] “China cannot be fooled! U.S. Expert: The United States and China and Russia ‘Three Divides the World,’ Pledged Not to Intervene in the Taiwan Strait” July 30, 2023 Accessed From: https://inf.news/en/world/c56536c3f2f569ab0a036bdd57c9dd33.html
[19] “The American-style division of the world: to pit Russia and China against each other” October 13, 2021 Accessed From: https://russtrat.ru/en/analytics_/13-october-2021-1605-6601
[20] Kent Courtney, Phoebe Courtney Disarmament: a Blueprint for Surrender (Conservative Society of America 1963) page 48.
[21] Central Committee of the Communist Party of China “Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union” March 22, 1966 Accessed http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/22march1966.htm
[22] “Soviet Display of Solidarity with China” The Times (London) February 16, 1963 page 8 and “Soviet-Red China Tie Still Strong, Khrushchev Says” Albuquerque Tribune February 15, 1963 page 1.
[23] “Chou Says Peking and Moscow Will Stand Together in a Crisis” New York Times February 4, 1964 page 2.
[24] Sleeper, Raymond. A Lexicon of Marxist-Leninist Semantics (Western Goals 1983) pages 309-310.
[25] “Minutes From a Conversation Between A.N. Kosygin and Mao Zedong” February 11, 1965
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[26] “Transcript of the discussions held with the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party which participated in the proceedings of the 9th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party” 26 July 1965 Accessed From the Cold War International History Project http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034B9D8-96B6-175C-949D8FCA396FC2DE&sort=Collection&item=Romania%20in%20the%20Cold%20War
[27] From the Diary of S.V. Chervonenko, Memorandum of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador to China Stepan V. Chervonenko and Mongolian Ambassador to China Dondongiin Tsevegmid October 7, 1964 Accessed From: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117700
[28] Cable From the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, “Memorandum of Conservation between China’s Ambassador to Cuba, Shen Jian, and Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro” February 11, 1961 Accessed From: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115153
[29] “Mao Zedong, Outline for a Speech on the International Situation” December 1959 Accessed From: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118893
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[31] Memorandum of conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung, 31 May 1984. on the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on 31 May 1984 Accessed From: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACF2837.pdf
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[33] “Hong Kong Journal Reviews Reagan’s China Visit: Assassination Plot” Cheng Ming June 6, 1984
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[38] Shuangrong He, Yuanting Chen History of Relations Between China and Latin American and Caribbean Countries (World Scientific Publishing Company 2022) page 266.
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[40] “Talks with Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping in Beijing” May 7, 1987 Accessed from the Cold War International History Project Accessed From: http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034BD62-96B6-175C-9E795F8F67764934&sort=Collection&item=Bulgaria%20in%20the%20Cold%20War
[41] Informational Note From the Official Visit in Poland of the PRC Foreign Minister, Comrade Wu Xueqian (March 10-13, 1987) March 17, 1987 Accessed From: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113770
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[46] “China Said to Be Letting in Arms” The Times (London) April 8, 1965 page 12 AND “Russian Arms Sent Across China by Rail to Beat the American Blockade of N. Vietnam” Times (London) May 19, 1972 page 6.
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[56] Tully, Andrew. “Mayaguez Story: A Warning” Lodi News Sentinel May 20, 1975 page 4.
[57] “Voice of GDR Reports US Sinking of Cambodian Ships” East Berlin Voice of the GDR Domestic Service May 14, 1975 AND “Voice of GDR Reports US Sinking of Cambodian Ships” East Berlin Voice of the GDR Domestic Service May 14, 1975 AND “Peace Council Cables Ford About Cambodian Aggression” ADN May 16, 1975 AND Hans-Juergen Wittenburg “Commentary” East Berlin Voice of the GDR Domestic Service May 15, 1975
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[64] “China Boosts Aid to PLO, Denounces U.S.” The Associated Press December 4, 1983
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[68] Ottaway, David B. “Ethiopian Military Relies on Peasants for Its Defense” Washington Post March 22, 1977 page A14 AND Cordesman, Anthony H. The Military Balance and Arms Sales in Yemen and the Red Sea States: 1986-1992 Center for Strategic and International Studies September, 1993 Accessed From: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9309_yemen&redseamilbal.pdf
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[72] “SWAPO Delegation in China: Military Aid” Xinhua February 2, 1983
[73] Hennie Van Vuuren Apartheid Guns and Money: A Tale of Profit (Oxford University Press, 2019) page 389.
[74] Vladimir Gennad’evich Shubin ANC: A View from Moscow (Mayibuye 1999) page 316.
[75] Del Vecchio, Mark “U.S., Chinese Communist Parties End 20-Year Split” United Press International June 22, 1988
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[78] “Nhan Dan Welcomes Normalisation of Sino-Soviet Relations” Nhan Dan May 22, 1989
[79] “Chinese Agencies Lose a Friend” Intelligence Newsletter November 12, 1998
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[81] “Information for the Politburo of the Central Committee of the SED, ‘Visit by Two Officials from the CCP Central Committee to the GDR (16 July to 23 August 1981)’” August 1981 Accessed From: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116935);
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[83] “Chinese, Romanian Military Leaders Meet” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service July 14, 1984
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[85] “Defence Minister on ‘new phase’ in relations with Hungarian Army” Xinhua News Agency November 10, 1988
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[89] “Chinese Agencies Lose a Friend” Intelligence Newsletter November 12, 1998
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[92] “Chief of Political Department of GDR Army in Beijing” Xinhua General News Agency September 26, 1989
[93] “Other Visitors; GDR” East German News Agency November 1, 1989 AND “GDR Guests Honored in Beijing” Xinhua News Service November 13, 1989
[94] Jan Adamec “Telegrams from Beijing: Czechoslovak Diplomats on the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests” June 2, 2020 Accessed From: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/telegrams-beijing-czechoslovak-diplomats-1989-tiananmen-square-protests
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[96] “Czechoslovak Top Leaders Meet PLA Senior Officer” Xinhua General Overseas News Service November 2, 1989
[97] “Chinese Public Security Minister Meets Romanian Delegation” Xinhua August 7, 1989
[98] “Chinese PLA Visiting Group Arrives in Bulgaria” Xinhua General News Service September 15, 1989 AND “Chinese Military Visiting Group Ends Visit to Bulgaria” Xinhua General Overseas News Service September 23, 1989
[99] “Cuban Military Delegation in Peking” Xinhua August 24, 1989
[100] “Chinese Army Chief Meets Cuban Military Delegation” Xinhua April 30, 1990
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[105] “Arms exports from German West to German East ran smoothly for years-despite the Cold War and the embargo” Der Spiegel September 27, 1992 Accessed From: https://www-spiegel-de.translate.goog/politik/kleiner-beitrag-a-fdd97264-0002-0001-0000-000013682502?context=issue&_x_tr_sl=de&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc
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[158] PRK was the acronym of the Vietnamese puppet communist regime of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, which succeeded the communist Khmer Rouge dictatorship, which was officially known as Democratic Kampuchea.
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If the split was "fake" -- which may be a poor analytical framing choice -- why then the contradiction as between your complaining of more trade and engagement on the one hand (presumably from at least 1980-2016 and again from 2021-2024) while simultaneously complaining of the Trump Administration's attempts to create or exasperate a split (2017-2021)?
Of post-cold war integration across Russia and China, you write:
" ... what was the response of the Americans? More trade and engagement. Fast forward to the 2020s and we continued to ignore the growing Sino-Russian threat. Most distressing was the Trump Administration’s strategy of looking for “splits” within the camp of our adversaries."
This is completely contradictory (one none too exceptional in this paper). The Trump Admin represented a unique break in US policy as regards a reversal at one degree or another of previous modes of engagement with China, premised on the goals of both freeing America from Chinese dependence and furthering any split that may exist as between Russia and China (and India). Why then is that a point of criticism with you, since you also criticize the previous 40-year policy stance as well, a largely bi-partisan one, which has resumed not by the way since Trump left office in measures at least (albeit some of the Trump tariffs remain in place, interestingly).
So which is it? You criticize both U.S. engagement towards integration as well as U.S. attempts to exploit differences across possible adversarial blocs and develop U.S. industrial independence.